Sunday, December 16, 2018
About Us
Please enter your email here, we would like to keep you informed.
Connect With Us - Facebook RSS
<December 2018>
Liberty In The News
Liberty Events
Conference Proceedings
Development is the Key
Economic Freedom
Education for Life
Freedom of Expression
Freedom to Trade
Globalization for the Good
Health is Wealth
Intellectual Property Rights
International Relations
Liberty is Security
Limited Government
Principles of Politics
Population - the ultimate resource
Property Rights
Regulatory Affairs
Rule of Law
Tax Freedom
Facts & Figures
 Regulatory Affairs
Fred Kahn’s first-class flight
Financial Times, United Kingdom Friday, December 31, 2010

Thomas W. Hazlett
Alfred Kahn, 93, passed away this week. He had played a key role in the 1970s deregulation of US airline fares. It is an achievement which saves Americans a stunning $20bn annually. Kahn’s contributions to electricity regulation and telecommunications policy were even more important. Under Kahn, CAB's charter collapsed. Fares were deregulated, and the CAB closed shop – by a 1978 act of Congress – in 1985, writes Thomas W. Hazlett in Financial Times.

This week’s passing of economist Alfred Kahn, 93, has brought tributes for the Cornell professor’s key role in the 1970s deregulation of US airline fares. That achievement saves Americans a stunning $20bn annually.

Yet Kahn’s contributions to electricity regulation and telecommunications policy may even exceed this high-flying success. Thanks to a superb, Pulitzer Prize-winning history of Kahn’s career, Thomas McCraw’s 1984 “Prophets of Regulation,” as well as Kahn’s own two-volume magnum opus, “The Economics of Regulation” (2nd Ed., 1988), and his papers and speeches on a variety of regulatory topics, we have a rich, bull-bodied view of the colourful life of a remarkable man.


But Kahn studied on. He was surprised to find that markets accommodated productive forces that eluded the immaculate models of economic analysis. He saw that that government regulation was no deus ex machina. Administrators faced challenges of their own; buffeted by political lobbying, they often raised prices for customers. Theory said that market forces should push prices down to marginal cost, and that regulators could help supply some oomph when competitive pressures were weak. But Kahn found electricity regulators fixing charges at the same level no matter the time of day. Analogising to the butcher shop, Prof. Kahn asked: “What would happen if everything that came out of the cow – steak, hamburger, suet, bones, and hide – were priced at average cost per pound?”

Kahn came to conclude “that society’s choices are always between or among imperfect systems.” But markets generated a dynamism lacking elsewhere, giving them an edge: “Wherever it seems likely to be effective, even very imperfect competition is preferable to regulation.”

In 1974, Prof. Kahn was asked to head the New York State Public Service Commission, an agency deeply committed to an arcane system of rates, taxes, subsidies, and profits, crafted by lobbyists, honed by lawyers, honoured by administrative appointees, and understood by none other.


Chairman Kahn did the unthinkable – he spoke freely and offered opinions citizens (and journalists) could understand. This not only broke ranks with regulators and other interested parties, whose coded language had been conveniently indecipherable, but was a radical academic departure. The guilds of academe are quite as barrier-conscious as the special interests of Albany.

Fred Kahn paid it no mind. He upended many regulatory inefficiencies at the PSC with reforms that rippled nationwide. Consumers, the environment, and the economy benefited. Then he moved to the Civil Aeronautics Board. After being appointed chairman by President Jimmy Carter in 1977, he characteristically read – and rejected – bureaucratic goobledeegook.


His gambit was clear: “If you can’t explain what you are doing to people in simple English, you are probably doing something wrong.” When he caught the agency “hiding behind a cloud of pompous verbiage,” he smelled a rat.

Indeed, the CAB did not protect the public, but fleeced it, raising airfares and squandering productive assets. Under Kahn, its charter collapsed. Fares were deregulated, and the CAB closed shop – by a 1978 act of Congress – in 1985.


But its execution left much to be desired. Kahn blasted the FCC’s attempts to impose textbook conditions of perfect competition – including improper mandates for marginal cost pricing. “I had anticipated the very error the FCC was about to commit,” wrote Kahn in a 2004 book (“Lessons from Deregulation”). Confused by the textbook version of “perfect competition,” regulators mandated existing telephone networks to share their lines with rivals, charging only what the new users cost them directly. This ignored the risks taken to create such networks in the past or improve them in the future. Such policies deterred, rather than advanced, the deployment of competing phone or broadband systems.

Justice Stephen Breyer, in Supreme Court decisions in 1999 and 2002, cited the Kahn critique. The powerful economic logic drove the DC Circuit (in 2004) to toss out the FCC’s ill-crafted network-sharing rules. Quickly, cable operators built out “digital phone” services. Today, the US residential market features nearly ubiquitous head-to-head fixed-line phone competition. This, and mobile rivalry – another deregulatory bonus – may far exceed the consumer gains delivered to air travellers.


This article was published in the Financial Times on Friday, December 31, 2010. Please read the original article here.
Author : Thomas Hazlett is Professor of Law & Economics at George Mason University
Tags- Find more articles on - FCC | kahn | regulations | telecommunication | US airline fares

Post your Comments on this Article

Comments will be moderated

More Related Articles
Regulatory Affairs
More Articles

An Initiative of
All rights reserved.